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INTERESTS OF AMICUS UTAH COUNCIL ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 
 The Utah Council on Victims of Crime is the statewide agency charged with 
promoting the rights of crime victims in the state.  Chaired by James M. Swink, Esq., it is 
comprised of more than 20 members from diverse agencies and backgrounds.  The 
Council is concerned that an independent state exclusionary rule suppresses reliable 
evidence against dangerous criminals, thus helping them to escape punishment and 
revictimize victims.  The Council has been involved in legislative efforts to eliminate the 
state exclusionary rule since 1993.   
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 I.  The Court should revisit the issue of whether article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution contains an exclusionary rule.  The decision announcing the existence of an 
exclusionary rule (State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991)), was not based on full 
briefing before the Court and the miscited controlling precedent on the issue. 
 II. Utah’s constitutional history and traditions reject a state exclusionary rule.  
Nothing in the text of article I, section 14, suggests that evidence should be suppressed, as 
this Court explained in State v. Aime, 220 P. 704 (Utah 1923).  Moreover, article I, section 
14 is separate from the trial-related criminal procedure provision of the Utah Constitution.  
In addition, when the Utah Constitution was drafted, no appellate court in any state had 
excluded unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution – a common-law approach that 
Utah’s Constitution presumably tracked.  Finally, the first Utah legislature created its own 
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remedies for violations of the search and seizure provisions – remedies that did not include 
the suppression of reliable evidence. 
 III. Contemporary attitudes in Utah are against an independent state exclusionary rule.  
The State’s elected representatives have clearly voted against excluding reliable evidence in 
1982 and 1994.   
 IV. Other states that have created an independent state exclusionary rule have 
frequently done so on the basis of their own unique state constitutional language or practice.  
These precedents are therefore of little relevance to construing Utah’s search and seizure 
provision.  
 V.  An independent state exclusionary rule is poor public policy.  First, an 
independent exclusionary rule creates litigation that complicates search and seizure, rather 
than simplifying it as was the original aim.  See State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (Ariz. 1984) 
(“one of the few things worse than a single exclusionary rule is two different exclusionary 
rules.”).  Second, an independent state exclusionary rule is unlikely to deter illegal police 
activity.  It will apply only in situations where the United States Supreme Court has upheld the 
police activity in question, circumstances unlikely to produce deterrence.  Third, the state 
exclusionary rule will operate only in situations where its application is a disproportionate 
response to the violation of a constitutional right.  It will operate only in situations where 
reasonable minds can differ – i.e., only in situations where at least five Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court have found the police practice at issue to be reasonable.  And yet it requires 
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the suppression of reliable evidence, even where that evidence is necessary to convict a 
guilty criminal to prevent him from victimizing others. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVISIT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
CONTAINS AN EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
 This Court has effectively interpreted Utah’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures -- article I, section 14 -- as containing its own exclusionary rule that operates 
independently of the federal exclusionary rule.  The way in which that law has developed, 
however, warrants reexamination of that conclusion. 
 The existence of an independent state exclusionary rule was first suggested by two 
justices of this Court in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).  The two-justice 
plurality opinion did not command a majority of the Court.  Yet in spite of that fact, this full 
Court then apparently assumed that Larocco was controlling law a year later in State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991), when it inaccurately cited the Larocco plurality 
opinion without noting that it was not controlling authority.  See 810 P.2d at 419 (citing 
plurality opinion without designating it as a plurality opinion).  The Thompson opinion 
contains only a single sentence on this critical issue – a single sentence that simply (mis)cites 
the Larocco plurality as controlling authority on the existence of a state exclusionary rule.  
 Because of the cursory treatment of the issue, it appears that Thompson may have 
overlooked early Utah Supreme Court decisions contradicting the Larocco plurality’s 
suggestion that Utah has its own exclusionary rule.  See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 28, 267 
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P.3d 210, 216 (Lee, J., concurring) (noting that Thompson “casually cast aside settled, 
longstanding precedents of this court that held” against a state exclusionary rule).  In State v. 
Aime, 220 P. 704 (1923), this Court unanimously held that article I, section 14 did not permit 
the suppression of reliable evidence.  This Court observed that the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Weeks (creating a federal exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment) 
was “not binding on state courts in interpreting similar provisions of their own state 
Constitutions.”  220 P. at 705-06.  This Court quoted extensively from the opinions of state 
courts and Wigmore’s evidence treatise to the effect that “[t]he judicial rules of evidence were 
never meant to be an indirect process of punishment.”  Id. at 705.  And, noted this Court, “The 
law cannot be justly administered without a knowledge of the facts in dispute.  The purpose of 
evidence is to establish the truth in legal tribunals, in order that justice may be done.”  Id. at 
707.  This Court therefore held: “With the profoundest respect for the high tribunal which has 
reached a contrary conclusion, we are led by the force of what we deem the better reason to 
conclude with the vast majority of state courts that the admissibility of evidence is not affected 
by the illegality of means through which it has been obtained.”  Id. at 708.1 
 Thirty-seven years later, this Court reaffirmed Aime on the eve of the Mapp decision.  
In State v. Fair, 353 P.2d 615, 615 (Utah 1960), this Court followed Aime,  holding that “[i]t is 
                                              
1 Interestingly, one of the members of the unanimous Aime Court was Samuel R. 
Thurman, who as a delegate to the Utah Constitutional Convention was actively involved in 
discussions on the provisions of article I and on the responsibilities of the state judiciary.  
Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under 
State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751, 790. 
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not necessary to determine whether or not the search was legal, because this court has 
previously held that evidence, even though illegally obtained, is admissible.” 
 After Mapp, this Court followed in “lockstep” with federal law in applying a state 
exclusionary rule.  So none of these decisions is particularly instructive on what the state 
constitutional history and traditions mean.  See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471 (plurality opinion) 
(Utah Supreme Court followed the federal lead “somewhat grudgingly”).  The most that can 
be said of these cases is that they “implicit[ly]” recognized a state exclusionary rule.  See id. 
at 472 (plurality opinion).2  Because of this lack of any explicit consideration of the issue, the 
unanimous 1923 Aime opinion – which was reaffirmed in Fair in 1960 and not questioned by 
even a single justice on the Utah Supreme Court as a matter of state constitutional law until 
1990 – would seem to be entitled to special deference.  Yet that deference was not given 
when this Court created a state exclusionary rule in Thompson without any discussion of the 
issue. 
 Amicus Utah Council on Victims of Crime respectfully requests this opportunity to 
provide full briefing to the Court  (with, of course, a response from the appellant) on the 
important issue of whether Utah’s Constitution requires the suppression of reliable evidence 
when it has been obtained by law enforcement agents who have followed federal 
constitutional requirements.  To be sure, Thompson makes an independent exclusionary rule 
the current law of the state.  But the Utah Council on Victims respectfully submits that, 
                                              
 2 See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751, 784-88 (reviewing these cases and 
concluding that they “fail to provide analytical support for an independent state exclusionary 
rule”). 
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through this brief, it can clearly establish that this decision establishing the independent state 
exclusionary rule is “erroneous . . . and that more good than harm will come by departing 
from [the] precedent.” State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶ 11, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (Utah 2003).  
Indeed, this Court has overruled a prior precedent when the earlier precedent “not only failed 
to explain why [it] was abandoning the long-established [previous] rule . . . but failed to cite 
that line of cases altogether.”  State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994).  Thompson 
miscited Larocco as controlling law and thus failed to explain why it was adopting an 
independent state exclusionary rule that had been rejected in Utah since the State’s founding.  
See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 45, 267 P.3d 210, 221 (Lee, J., concurring) (“Thompson 
thus relied on the Larocco plurality for the existence of a Utah exclusionary rule without 
acknowledging that the Larocco rule had never commanded a majority and without any 
discussion of the court's contrary precedent or of the history and text of article I, section 
14.”). 
 Reconsideration of the state exclusionary rule question is appropriate for one 
additional reason: In neither Thompson nor Larocco did the Court receive full briefing on the 
issue of whether article I, section 14 contains an exclusionary rule.  In Larocco, appellant 
Larocco did not provide any briefing to support an independent exclusionary rule, simply 
assuming that exclusion of evidence was part of article I, section 14.  Similarly, in 
Thompson, none of the briefs substantively discussed the state exclusionary rule (or even 
cited State v. Larocco, for that matter).  
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 The issue of an independent state exclusionary rule is an important one that deserves 
careful consideration from this Court – after full and fair briefing from interested groups, 
such as the Utah Council on Victims of Crime.  The Court should therefore consider the 
question carefully in this case – where the issue has been fully briefed.  The Court should 
conclude that suppression of reliable evidence is not a permissible remedy for violations of 
article I, section 14.   
II. UTAH’S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND TRADITIONS REJECT 
A STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
 When interpreting a state constitutional provision, the Court’s “goal is to ascertain the 
drafters’ intent.”  State v. Hernandez, 268 P.3d 822, 824 (Utah 2011); accord DIRECTV v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2015 UT 93, ¶ 47, 364 P.3d 1036, 1049 (looking to the meaning of 
provisions in other state constitutions “at the time of the ratification of the Utah 
Constitution”); Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah Cty., 15 P.2d 633, 637 (Utah 1932) 
(“[T]erms used in [the Utah] Constitution must be taken to mean what they meant to the 
minds of the voters of the state when the provision was adopted.”); State ex rel. LLoyd v. 
Elliott, 44 P. 248, 250 (Utah 1896) (looking to the intent of “the framers of our constitution” 
to determine the “the meaning attributed to the term ‘writ of quo warranto’” in article VIII, § 
4 of the Utah Constitution); see also Jeremy M. Christiansen, Some Thoughts on Utah 
Originalism: A Response, 2014 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 1, 9 n.60, 10 n.61–67, 11 n.68 
(collecting cases from Utah’s founding era which endorsed originalism and rejected 
alternative, policy-based approaches to interpreting specific constitutional provisions).  The 
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conventional tools for proper state constitutional interpretation have been set out at length in 
other opinions and include such things as constitutional text, drafting history, contemporary 
understandings, structural analysis of the Constitution, and contemporary public attitudes.  
See generally American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah 
2006); State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 45, 267 P.3d 210, 221 (Lee, J., concurring) 
(discussing this point with reference to Utah Const., art. I, § 14).  All of these conventional 
interpretive tools point against a state exclusionary rule.  See generally Paul G. Cassell, The 
Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: 
The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751. 
A. The Text of Article I, Section 14 Does Not Support An Exclusionary Rule. 
 When interpreting the state’s constitution, this Court “look[s] first to the plain 
meaning of the constitutional provision at issue.”  State v. Willis, 2004 Utah 93, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 
1218, 1219 (Utah 2004).  Like the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 14 makes no 
reference to the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for a violation.  As this Court explained in 
Aime, “no authority, so far as we have been able to discover, has suggested that the 
subsequent use of articles [illegally] taken as evidence is in itself any part of the unlawful 
invasion of such constitutional guaranty.”  Aime, 220 P. at 706 (internal quotation omitted); 
see also State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 47, 267 P.3d 210, 221 (Lee, J., concurring) (art. I, § 
14 “simply provides a guarantee of security against unreasonable searches and seizures and a 
prohibition on warrants without probable cause. It says nothing about an exclusionary—or 
any other—remedy for the violation of its provisions”). 
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 In response, one might argue that because the United States Supreme Court has 
adopted the exclusionary rule to deter violation of the Fourth Amendment, the parallel 
provision of article I, section 14 likewise contains such a rule.  But such an approach is 
essentially an argument for “lockstep” interpretation of the federal and Utah constitutions, an 
interpretative approach a majority of this Court has rejected in other contexts.  See, e.g., 
Flowell Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87, 361 P.3d 91, 98 (“we do not 
presume that federal court interpretations of federal Constitutional provisions control the 
meaning of identical provisions in the Utah Constitution”).  Moreover, the federal 
exclusionary rule no longer rests on a constitutional interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Instead, the Supreme Court now views the rule as a “judicially-created remedy.”  See, e.g., 
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (the cases acknowledge “the exclusionary 
rule for what it undoubtedly is—a ‘judicially created remedy’ of this Court's own making”).  
The Utah Constitution creates a sharper division of powers, see Utah Const., Art. V, which 
means that this Court does not have the same sort of free-ranging remedial powers as the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  See generally Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 827-33.   
 In addition, differences between the federal and Utah constitutional structures 
likewise argue against a state exclusionary rule.  The federal Bill of Rights contains trial-
related procedural provisions in at least two different amendments, the Fifth and the Sixth.  
In contrast, the Utah Constitution concentrates the trial provisions in one section.  The 
section dealing with the rights of accused persons, article I, section 12, list various rights 
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(such as the right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and the right to speedy trial).  None 
of the other sections of the Declaration of Rights contains trial-related procedural 
provisions.3  It is reasonable to suppose that if the drafters of the search and seizure provision 
had viewed it as creating a right of the “accused” applicable “[i]n criminal prosecutions,” 
they would have incorporated the provision with the other trial-related rights in section 12.   
B. The drafting history at the Utah Constitutional Convention provides no 
support for an exclusionary rule 
 Review of the available materials strongly suggests that the framers of the Utah 
constitution did not intend to create a state exclusionary rule.  The records of the Utah 
Constitutional Convention shed little direct light on the framers' intent in drafting article I, 
section 14, as the Convention records from March 25, 1895 reveal only that "Section 14 was 
read and passed without amendment."  1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 319 (1898) (recounting proceedings on March 25, 1895).  Nonetheless, other 
considerations regarding the Convention's deliberations indicate that the framers did not 
intend to exclude reliable evidence from criminal trials.  See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 
57, 267 P.3d 210, 223 (Lee, J., concurring) (“The drafting history of section 14 further 
undermines the conclusion that that provision would have been originally understood to 
incorporate an exclusionary rule”). 
                                              
 3.  UTAH CONST. art. I, § 5 guarantees the right to habeas corpus, a right not tied to 
trial procedures.  Similarly, pre-trial procedures are discussed in art. I, § 8 (bail) and art. I, § 
13 (prosecution by indictment or information); post-trial procedures are discussed in art. I, § 
9 (no "cruel or unusual punishments").  The Declaration of Rights also contains a general 
due process clause, art. I, § 7, and a guarantee of the right to trial by jury, art. I, § 10.   
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 The inspiration behind the Declaration of Rights came from the federal Bill of Rights.  
2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1847 (1898).  However, it is 
also widely recognized that the drafters of the Utah Constitution borrowed provisions from 
other state constitutions.  See John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government -- The 
History of Utah’s Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311, 324.  Regardless of which 
constitution was the model for article I, section 14,4 the judicial view in this country was 
contrary to an exclusionary rule.  Indeed, at the time the Convention considered article I, 
section 14, no appellate court in any state excluded unlawfully obtained evidence under its 
constitution.  See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 803; see also Lester J. Mazor, Notes 
on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 326, 346 (The development of 
the federal exclusionary rule did not have “an antecedent in the language of a single state 
constitution, either as a result of amendment or the adoption of a new constitution”).  Nor did 
the U.S. Supreme Court exclude evidence obtained in violation of the  Fourth Amendment.  
That did not occur until almost twenty years later, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914).  Moreover, at the time of the Utah Constitutional Convention, the common law rule 
plainly admitted illegally-seized evidence.  See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 49, 267 P.3d 
210, 221 (Lee, J., concurring) (“the historical record points decidedly against the conclusion 
that section 14 would have been understood in its historical context to call for an 
                                              
4  See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 803 (arguing for Nevada’s search and 
seizure provision as the model).   
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exclusionary remedy. That remedy, in fact, was virtually unknown at that time.”).The United 
States Supreme Court, just a few years after Utah's 1895 Convention, explained the common 
law rule as follows: “Evidence which is pertinent to the issue is admissible, although it may 
have been procured in an irregular or even in an illegal manner.”  Adams v. New York, 192 
U.S. 585, 596 (1904); accord Regina v. Leatham, [1861] 8 Cox C.C. 498, 501 (Crompton, 
J.,) (no exclusionary rule under English common law).  See generally 24 A.L.R. 1408 (1923) 
(Annotation of the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure).  
 It is a standard rule of construction that legislators are aware of the common law and 
that their handiwork, if ambiguous, should be construed to follow that approach.  See 
American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 49, 140 P.3d 1235, 1249 (“this 
Court has often resorted to the common law in construing various provisions in the Utah 
Declaration of Rights”).  The framers of the Utah constitution were well aware of common 
law principles and incorporated them into their Constitution.  For example, delegate Charles 
S. Varian urged the convention to adopt language in article I, section 12 guaranteeing the 
right to confront adverse witnesses that was “within the ancient landmarks, so that every 
lawyer and every layman may know just what this does mean.”  1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 307-08 (1898).  The ancient landmarks at issue here 
  
13
would block the suppression of reliable evidence because of mere objections how the police 
obtained it.5 
C. Article I, Section 14 Is Not a Self-Executing Constitutional Provision 
 Article I, section 14 is not a “self-executing” COnstitutional provision in that it does 
contain a specific remedy for violations of its provisions.  Yet the framers of the Utah 
Constitution were aware of the concept of  “self-executing” constitutional provisions and knew 
how to draft such enforcement provisions when desirable.  See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. 
REV. at 807-08.  The reasonable inference is that the drafters designed article I, section 14 to 
be enforced through means other than those contained in the constitution. 
 This conclusion is confirmed by the subsequent action of the first Utah legislature, 
which provided specific criminal sanctions for unreasonable searches and seizures.  The 
legislature adopted a misdemeanor offense covering any “person who maliciously and 
without probable cause shall procure a search warrant to be issued and executed . . . .” 
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH § 5101 (1898).  The legislature also enacted a law that "[a] 
peace officer who, in executing a search warrant, shall willfully exceed his authority or 
exercise it with unnecessary severity, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."  Id., ' 5102.  
As for warrantless searches, another statute provided that “[e]very public officer . . . who under 
the pretense or color of any process or other legal authority, arrests any person or detains him 
                                              
5 It is sometimes argued that history of anti-polygamy raids in Utah provides a basis 
for broadly interpreting art. I, § 14.  The overwhelming difficulties with this position are 
discussed in Paul G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance 
of the Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. REV.1.   
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against his will, or seizes or levies upon any property, or dispossesses any one of any lands or 
tenements, without a regular process or other lawful authority therefor, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”  Id.,  ' 4140.  The legislature also adopted various criminal provisions that 
could be applied to official misconduct.6   
 At the same time as the first legislature adopted these criminal penalties for 
unreasonable searches and seizures, it did not create any right to exclude unlawfully obtained 
evidence at trial.  Instead, it provided that “the rules of evidence in civil actions shall be 
applicable also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this code.”  REVISED 
STATUTES OF UTAH § 5012 (1898).The rules for civil actions contained no exclusionary rule. 
See id., §§ 2851-3757.  The specific rules for criminal actions likewise did not authorize the 
exclusion of reliable evidence.  The criminal rules were intended to be exhaustive: “All 
forms of pleading in criminal actions, and the rules by which the sufficiency of such pleading 
is to be determined, shall be those prescribed by this code.”  REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH ' 
                                              
6.  Section 4691 provided that all state officers "not liable to impeachment" may be 
prosecuted criminally. Section 4153 forbade the “willful omission to perform any duty 
enjoined by law upon any public officer” and authorized a misdemeanor penalty.  Section 
4154 indicated that “where the performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and no 
penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed by any statute, the doing of such act is a 
misdemeanor.” 
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4728 (1898).  The various pleadings concerning defenses that could be raised do not include 
a motion for suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence.7   
 To the extent that the rules adopted by the first legislature are silent on the existence 
of an exclusionary rule, the “gap filling” provisions in the Utah statutes suggest that no such 
rule existed.  The first legislature provided that "[t]he common law of England, so far as it is 
not repugnant to, or in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, or the 
constitution and laws of this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state."  
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH § 2488 (1898). As noted earlier, the common law approach 
both in England and in this country was to admit relevant evidence even if illegally obtained.   
 The fact that the first Utah legislature created remedies for illegal searches has 
important constitutional implications.  Utah has a scheme of clearly defined governmental 
responsibilities.  Article V of the Utah Constitution divides the powers sharply: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Under this system of sharply separated power, decisions regarding remedies reside with the 
Legislature.  As this Court explained in an early decision, “The right and power, as well as 
the duty, of creating rights to provide remedies, lies with the Legislature, and not with the 
                                              
7.  See id., § 4770 (time to answer indictment or information "not less than one day"); § 
4771 (when information must be set aside); § 4772 (when indictment must be set aside); § 
4779 (grounds for demurring to an indictment); § 4799 (removal when impartial trial cannot 
be had); § 4845 (order of trial); § 5012 (rules of evidence same as in civil cases). 
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courts.”  Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915) (emphasis added).  Moreover, any 
asserted judicial capacity to create remedies is limited by questions of institutional 
competence.  As we discuss in Part V below, determining whether applying the exclusionary 
rule is appropriate requires weighing the costs and benefits ‑‑ the cost of lost convictions 
against the benefit of deterring unconstitutional searches and seizures.  It also requires a 
substantive review of the availability and efficacy of other remedies for unconstitutional 
searches.   
 Given Utah's scheme of sharply separated powers, evaluating the competing concerns 
would seem to lie peculiarly within the province of the state legislature.  The legislature has 
shown a willingness to provide remedies in this area from the first days of statehood, and 
nothing in this Court’s opinions suggests that these actions were beyond the scope of 
legislative power.  But if such remedies are within legislative competence, by definition 
under the Utah Constitution they are outside judicial competence. 
D. If Article I, Section 14 Is Self-Executing, then the Self-Executing Remedy 
is a Tort Action Rather than Exclusion of Evidence. 
 For all the reasons just explained, the Council believes that article I, section 14 is not 
a self-executing constitutional provision.  If the Court disagrees with this conclusion, 
however, it is clear that the remedy for a violation of the provision would not be suppression 
of reliable evidence, but rather a tort remedy.  This is the conclusion of an important article 
that will appear shortly in the Hawaii Law Review, published by a recent distinguished 
graduate of the University of Utah College of Law.  See Jeremy M. Christiansen, State 
Search and Seizure: The Original Meaning, 38 HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (available 
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at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2525954).  After examining the texts 
of all fifty search and seizure provisions in state constitutions, case law from the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, and state constitutional conventions, Mr. Christianasen 
concludes that nearly every state shares a common original meaning when it comes to search 
and seizure provisions – i.e., an original meaning that provides “to every citizen, guilty or 
innocent, a self-executing, constitutional tort that protects interests of privacy, property, 
dignity, and reputation via compensatory and punitive damages. Courts should return to this 
original meaning so as to ensure that all citizens actually have the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Id. at 1.  The Council believes that rather than 
suppressing reliable evidence of guilt as the remedy for a violation of article I, section 14, 
standard tort remedies would likely be applicable. But the Court need not reach the question 
of exactly what tort remedies are available to conclude in this case that an exclusionary 
remedy is unavailable.   
III. CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC ATTITUDES REJECT AN INDEPEN-
DENT STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
 From the above sources, it is clear that the intention of the drafters of the Utah 
Constitution in 1895 was not to allow the suppression of reliable evidence under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.  It is sometimes argued, however, that Utah’s 
Constitution should be construed in light of contemporary public attitudes.  But see American 
Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 57, 140 P.3d 1235, 1252 (construing Utah 
Constitution’s freedom of speech provisions based on historical understanding); State v. 
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Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 29, 267 P.3d 210, 216-17 (Lee, J., concurring) (“Originalism is more 
than just ‘the dominant form of constitutional interpretation during most of our nation's 
history.’ It is a theory that is essential to any system of government that finds its legitimacy 
in the will of the people as expressed in positive laws enacted by their representatives.”).   
For the sake of completeness, this part demonstrates that in recent years, Utah’s elected 
representatives have also rejected an exclusionary rule.   
 In 1982, the representatives of the citizens of the state overwhelmingly passed, and 
the governor approved, the “Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act.” Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement Act of 1982, ch. 10, 1982 Utah Laws 84 (codified in scattered sections of Utah 
Code Ann).  The Act created a civil cause of action against government agencies whose 
employees violated protected Fourth Amendment rights.  At the same time, section five of 
the Act directly explained the legislature's intent to create a remedy for illegal searches that 
would “stand in lieu of the exclusion of evidence in criminal cases for violation of 
constitutionally protected rights except where those violations are substantial and peace 
officers were not acting in good faith.”  UTAH CODE ANN.  ' 78-16-1 (1982).  The legislative 
history of the Act confirms that the legislature believed the exclusionary rule did not deter 
illegal searches8 while at the same time was an obstacle to justice.9  This Court ultimately 
                                              
8.  The chief sponsor of the bill explained that “[t]he studies which were presented to 
the Interim Study Committee took the position and concluded . . . that the existing 
mechanism does not deter violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  House debate on H.B. No. 
69 (Jan. 30, 1982), record #14, side 1 (remarks of Rep. McKeachnie). 
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declared the Act unconstitutional because of various procedural problems under the federal 
constitution.  See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).  
 In 1982, there was no state exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment Enforcement 
Act was targeted at the federal exclusionary rule.  After the independent state exclusionary 
rule came into existence, amicus Utah Council on Victims of Crime asked its legislative 
supporters to work for a state constitutional amendment that would abolish the state 
exclusionary rule.  In 1993, the result was Senate Joint Resolution No. 13, which passed the 
Senate by a vote of 22-1.  UTAH SENATE J. 50th Leg., at 454 (1994).  In the House Judiciary 
Committee, the argument was made that there was no need for legislative action in 1993, as 
the earliest the voters could approve the measure would be next election year.  The 
Resolution was therefore tabled.  UTAH HOUSE J., 50th Leg., at 647 (1994).  In 1994, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 1 was introduced.  It provided in relevant part: 
Except as specifically provided by statute hereafter enacted, no evidence 
discovered in the course of a search or seizure shall be excluded under Article 
I, Sec. 14, Utah Constitution from any criminal or civil proceeding or trial if 
the search or seizure was conducted in conformity with standards, including 
good faith standards, established under the United Sates Constitution.   
With the support of Attorney General Jan Graham, the measure passed the Senate by a vote 
of 24-4, UTAH SEN. J., 50th Leg., at 255-56 (1994), and the House Judiciary Committee by a 
                                                                                                                                                 
9.  See House debate on H.B. No. 69 (Jan. 21, 1982), record #2, side 1 (remarks of Rep. 
McKeachnie) (“The consensus of the Judiciary Committee was that [the exclusionary rule] is 
one of the largest loopholes to getting conviction of people who may be guilty of committing 
crimes.  It's really a technicality, and the bill is an attempt to overcome it”). 
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vote of 6-2.  UTAH HOUSE J., 50th Leg., at 392 (1994).  The measure, however, never 
obtained a floor vote.   
 These legislative actions confirm that in recent years Utah’s elected representatives 
have not supported the suppression of reliable evidence in criminal proceedings, particularly 
where law enforcement officers have followed federal constitutional standards in obtaining 
the evidence. 
IV. THE PRACTICES OF OTHER STATES DO NOT SUPPORT AN 
INDEPENDENT UTAH EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
 This Court has also occasionally found it helpful to examine the interpretations of 
other state courts in interpreting the Utah Constitution.  Indeed, the Larocco plurality took 
this approach, asserting that at the time the Supreme Court decided to impose a federal 
exclusionary rule on the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), “more than half of [the 
states] were already voluntarily applying” the exclusionary rule.  See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 
472 (plurality opinion) (citing Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, which in turn cited an appendix in 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, Appendix, pp. 224-232 (1960)).  Even assuming that 
this calculation is correct ‑‑ and it appears that, in fact, the majority were generally against 
the rule10 ‑‑ the fact remains that those decisions provide little analytic support for state 
                                              
10.  See Cassell, supra, at 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 793 n.272.  
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exclusionary rules.  Many of those decisions simply followed the federal Weeks rule in  
“lockstep,”11 an approach that this Court has eschewed in other contexts.   
 To bolster its argument, the Larocco plurality immediately added that “[a]t least 
eighteen states have adopted an independent state exclusionary rule.”  794 P.2d at 472 
(plurality opinion).  Setting aside the obvious rejoinder -- 32 states have not adopted such a 
rule12 ‑‑ this is tenuous support for a Utah exclusionary rule.  To begin with, one can 
question the necessity for looking outside the borders of the state to resolve a question of 
Utah law where the Utah traditions are so clear.  Moreover, many out-of-state decisions rest 
on considerations that are inapplicable to Utah.   
 For example, the Louisiana exclusionary rule is based on unique language in the 
Louisiana constitution, language not present in Utah’s constitution.  Article I, section 5 of the 
Louisiana Constitution (adopted in 1974) provides, after reciting a general prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures: “Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure 
conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the 
                                              
11.  See, e.g., Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 547 (Crim. Ct. App. Okla. 1923) ("if it appears 
that the highest court of the land has definitely fixed a rule applying to the introduction of 
evidence obtained by illegal seizure, it follows without argument that the rule of evidence in 
the state courts, where like facts and principles of law are involved, should conform to that 
settled by the court having supreme prestige and authority."); State v. George, 231 P. 683, 
684-85 (Wyo. 1924) (adopting federal rule because “[t]he Constitution of the United States 
and the laws passed pursuant thereto govern the people of this state as much so as the 
Constitution and law of this state”).  
12.  To be sure, many of the 32 states probably are following a lockstep approach to 
interpreting their state constitutions.  But in doing so, they are implicitly rejecting an 
independent state exclusionary rule. 
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appropriate court.”  This implicitly recognizes an exclusionary rule.  See  State v. Culotta, 
343 So.2d 977, 981 (La. 1977). 
 Similarly, the Washington exclusionary rule rests on specific language in its 
constitution and a drafting history behind that provision suggesting the appropriateness of a 
broad interpretation.  Article I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution provides: “No person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”  In 
drafting this provision, the Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889 specifically 
declined to adopt the wording of the Fourth Amendment, preferring a broader formulation.  
See State v. White, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (Wash. 1982).   
 The Hawaii exclusionary rule likewise rests on specific drafting history supporting an 
exclusionary rule at the Hawaiian Constitutional Convention.  See Hawaii v. Polini, 367 P.2d 
499, 506 (Haw. 1961) (referring to Hawaii Constitutional Convention, Committee of the 
Whole Report No. 5, 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 301) (specifically 
indicating intent to adopt federal decisions creating an exclusionary rule).  No comparable 
drafting history exists for Utah. 
 The Alaska exclusionary rule is based on a specific provision in the Alaska rules of 
evidence requiring exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.  See ALASKA R. EVID. 412 
("Evidence illegally obtained shall not be used over proper objection by the defendant in a 
criminal prosecution for any purpose [except for certain purposes in perjury prosecutions]"); 
see Harker v. Alaska, 663 P.2d 932, 934 (Alaska 1983).  In deciding search and seizure 
issues, the Alaska courts have also relied on the unique “character of life in Alaska,” Ravin v. 
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State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975), and on the Alaska Constitution's explicit protection 
of a right of privacy, see ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed"); see, e.g., State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874-82 
(Alaska 1978) (interpreting this provision).  The Utah rules of evidence contain no such 
provision and, indeed, provide exactly the opposite of the Alaska rule.  See UTAH R. EVID. 
402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution 
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  See generally Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 833-36 (discussing 
how the Utah Rules of Evidence contradict an independent state exclusionary rule).  
 Other states have adopted an independent state exclusionary rule without any careful 
examination of the issues involved or their state’s own history.  A good illustration comes 
from New York, where early twentieth century case law, including a well-known decision 
penned by then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo, unambiguously rejected the exclusionary rule as a 
matter of statutory and common law, as well as federal constitutional law.  People v. Defore, 
242 N.Y. 13, 15, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926) (“There has been no 
blinking the consequences.  The criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered.”).  In 1938, a constitutional convention was held when a state constitutional 
search and seizure provision was adopted.  A proposal to engraft the exclusionary rule was 
rejected.  See People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 408-11 (1985) (Titone, J., concurring).  
Nonetheless, in 1985 the New York Court of Appeals decided to adopt its own exclusionary 
rule, thereby “amending the [New York] Constitution in a fashion explicitly rejected by the 
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delegates to the 1938 Constitutional Convention, and overruling three decisions sub 
silentio.”  Id. at 408.  Such judicial fiat provides little useful precedent for this Court 
interpreting the Utah Constitution; this Court has consistently recognized that the goal of 
state constitutional analysis “is to discern the intent and purpose of both the drafters of our 
constitution and, more importantly, the citizens who voted it into effect.”  American Bush v. 
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, at ¶ 12, 140 P.3d at 1240. 
V. AN INDEPENDENT STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONSTITUTES 
BAD PUBLIC POLICY. 
 The previous sections of this brief have established that Utah’s history and traditions 
stand opposed to an independent state exclusionary rule, as do the contemporary attitudes of 
its elected officials.  These conclusions should be enough to establish that, as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation, there is no basis for an independent state exclusionary rule.  For 
the sake of completeness, however, this section explains why an independent state 
exclusionary rule is bad public policy.   
 Of course, an assessment of an independent state exclusionary rule does not require 
any revisitation of the on-going debate concerning the federal exclusionary rule.  It is enough 
for present purposes to note that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is generally 
justified as a deterrent to unlawful police behavior.  In the words of Mapp v. Ohio, “the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter ‑‑ to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way ‑‑ by removing the incentive to disregard it.” 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; see Sims v. Collection Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 
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6, 14 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion) (observing that “one of the frequently cited purposes of 
the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful seizures”).  On the other hand, critics of the 
rule believe that any deterrent effect is unproven, the sanction of the rule is disproportionate 
to the offense, and the costs of the rule (release of criminals because the “constable has 
blundered,” Defore, 150 N.E. at 587 (Cardozo, J.).,) are too high, particularly in light of 
alternative remedies (such as civil suits) that could be made available.  See generally Dallin 
H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 678-
754 (1970). 
 Assuming arguendo that the justification for a federal exclusionary rule is a close call, 
the additional considerations against extending the rule at the state level are more than 
enough to tip the scales the other way.  The Utah exclusionary rule is troublesome in at least 
three respects: (A) the state exclusionary rule is inconsistent with the central premise of the 
Larocco plurality opinion – i.e., that a need exists to simplify search and seizure law; (B) the 
state exclusionary rule is unlikely to produce any significant incremental deterrent effect 
beyond that created by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule; and (C) the state rule will 
typically operate in situations where its effect is disproportionate to the constitutional 
violation at hand.   
A. An Independent  State Exclusionary Rule is Inconsistent with Larocco's 
Purpose of Simplifying Search and Seizure Law 
 The germinal idea behind the Larocco plurality, first expressed in Justice Zimmerman's 
concurrence in State v. Hygh, was the need to develop “simpler rules that can be more easily 
followed by police officers and the courts.”  711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
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concurring).  Justice Durham expanded on this theme in her plurality opinion in Larocco, 
concluding: “The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to try to simplify, if 
possible, the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily followed by the police 
and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public with consistent and predictable 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 794 P.2d at 469 (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis added). 
 Far from simplifying the law, an independent exclusionary rule doubles the confusion.  
The Arizona Supreme Court has pithily noted that “one of the few things worse than a single 
exclusionary rule is two different exclusionary rules.” State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (Ariz. 
1984) (holding that Arizona’s exclusionary rule is no broader than the federal exclusionary 
rule); see also People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 825 (Colo. 1985) (Rovira, J., dissenting) (“The 
law of search and seizure and the accompanying exclusionary rule is difficult enough to 
apply with but one line of authority to follow ‑‑ that of the United States Supreme Court.  
To add a separate line of authority under the state constitution compounds the difficulty 
immeasurably.”); People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 284 (Cal. 1976) (Richardson, J., 
dissenting) (“The vagaries and uncertainties of constitutional interpretations, particularly in 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment sectors of our criminal law, are the hard facts of life with 
which the general public, the courts, and law enforcement officials must grapple daily.  This 
condition necessarily breeds uncertainty, confusion, and doubt.  It will not be eased or 
allayed by a proliferation of multiple judicial interpretations of nearly identical language.”); 
  
27
John K. Van de Kamp & Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule: Analysis of 
Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1109, 1121 
(1982) (criticizing independent California decisions because “[t]hese two tiers of 
constitutional interpretations can only complicate the police officer's task of understanding 
what the law requires”). 
 The confusing effects of independent state standards enforced via a state exclusionary 
rule become immediately apparent when one recognizes that Utah’s law enforcement officers 
are often involved in joint federal-state investigations and prosecutions.  For example, the 
official website for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah describes “Utah 
Project Safe Neighborhood” as a partnership “among federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment agencies and prosecutors.”  https://www.justice.gov/usao-ut/project-safe-
neighborhoods (visited April 28, 2016).  Even apart from cases that directly involve federal 
law enforcement agencies, Utah’s law enforcement officers often wind up in federal court 
where only federal standards apply.  For example, many drug offenses investigated initially 
by state law enforcement agencies – including in particular many traffic stops -- are also 
prosecuted in federal court because of stiff mandatory-minimum sentences prescribed for 
violations of federal drug laws.  See Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. at 838-40.  The state 
officer making the stop, of course, cannot be sure, at the time that search and seizure issues 
arise, whether the case will be prosecuted in state or federal court.  The flip side of this 
problem is when a federal law enforcement officer applies for a search warrant in state court.  
“Federal drug agents cannot, and should not, be expected to know the individual 
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constitutional requirements in each and every state.  Because of the need for uniformity in 
the law, decisions of the United States Supreme Court that directly affect interstate drug 
trafficking should be approached with deference.”  See Oates, 698 P.2d at 822 (Erickson, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 Whatever one thinks of independent interpretation of state constitutional provisions, 
clearly the “simplest” approach is not to create a state exclusionary rule.  This would avoid 
litigation over compliance with state constitutional provisions in criminal proceedings.  In 
response, it might be argued that a certain amount of complexity is a necessary incident of 
interpreting state constitutions independently from the federal approach.  Perhaps this 
rejoinder is true, but the limited point here is that, from a public policy perspective, 
simplification of search and seizure law would be promoted best by abolishing Utah’s 
independent exclusionary rule. 
B. A State Exclusionary Rule is Unlikely to Generate an Incremental 
Deterrent Effect Beyond the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule 
 From a public policy perspective, it is also unclear what benefit comes from an 
independent state exclusionary rule.  Presumably the justification for such a rule is to deter 
police misconduct.  But the deterrent effect of a federal exclusionary rule is already highly 
debatable.  It seems to be clear that “[n]o one actually knows how effective the [federal] 
exclusionary rule is as a deterrent.”  Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 55.  Then-Professor Dallin H. Oaks’ study of the deterrent effect, 
although conducted in the late 1960’s, still remains the classic in the field and could not 
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demonstrate a deterrent effect.  See generally Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).   
 Regardless of whether the federal exclusionary rule deters, however, claims about the 
desirability of a state exclusionary rule must be evaluated against the backdrop of this federal 
rule.  Any suggestion that the absence of a state exclusionary rule will “turn the police loose” 
to abuse citizens is demonstrably false because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
which applies to all state prosecutions, remains in place regardless of how a state constitution 
is interpreted.  In virtually all instances of abusive police conduct to which a state 
exclusionary rule would apply, the Mapp exclusionary rule applies as well.   
 What is at issue in a state exclusionary rule debate is whether to extend the 
exclusionary sanction to a limited subcategory of state constitutional violations: violations in 
which officers offend the state constitution but not the federal constitution.  The conditions 
surrounding this subset of violations are extremely unlikely ones for deterrence.   
 To begin with, "[t]he deterrent effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is also dependent 
upon whether the arrest and search and seizure rules that it is supposed to enforce are stated 
with sufficient clarity that they can be understood and followed by common ordinary police 
officers." Oaks, supra, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. at 731.  Different state constitutional rules will, by 
definition, be conflicting and uncertain, as they will conflict with federal constitutional 
principles that the United States Supreme Court has announced.  Justice Stewart articulated 
the problem very nicely when he observed: 
Indeed, in the context of state search and seizure law as applied in routine 
traffic stops of vehicles, I have previously taken the position that this Court 
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ought not embroider the margins of an already highly complicated area of the 
law by creating relatively insignificant departures from federal search and 
seizure law simply because some comparatively minor aspect of that law 
seems to be ill-founded or inconsistent with other federal law. Further 
complicating an already extremely intricate and complex area of the law 
would, in my view, not only have the adverse effect on law enforcement of 
compounding confusion in that area of the law but, more importantly, it would 
undermine the very liberty values that the search and seizure provisions of the 
Utah and federal constitutions are designed to protect. 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1240 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
 A good illustration of the problems comes from the Larocco case itself.  In the 
interests of “simplifying” the law, the Larocco plurality announced the requirement that 
vehicle searches must be conducted pursuant to a warrant when practical.  Larocco, 794 P.2d 
at 469-70 (plurality opinion).  The plurality, however, would allow warrantless searches 
when justified by “exigent circumstances” such as the need “to protect the safety of police or 
the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence.” Id. at 470 (plurality opinion). 
 Assuming that the plurality opinion gains a third vote and becomes the law of the state 
(another issue about which state law enforcement officers must speculate), development of 
the precise contours of the “exigency” exception will likely take years of litigation.  A 
critical question is whether the relative mobility of a vehicle is itself enough of an 
“exigency” to justify a warrantless search?  If so, the exigency “exception” might swallow 
the general “warrants when practicable” rule in the context of car searches.  Yet the mobility 
of vehicles has long been recognized as an “exigent” circumstance.  See State v. Limb, 581 
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies where  
“there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, 
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the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must 
be obtained”) (quoted with apparent approval in Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470).   
 However this concept develops in this state, it is likely to be less clear than federal 
standards.  Utah already suffers from a relatively paucity of published case authority.  See 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 570 n.1 (Utah 1991).  In contrast, federal search and seizure 
principles are subject to interpretation by at least a dozen federal courts of appeal, hundreds 
of federal district court judges, and the state courts in all the states.  This generates a body of 
case law that can be much more readily applied, even when the United States Supreme Court 
announces a new constitutional principle.13 
 Deterrence from an independent state exclusionary rule is also unlikely for another 
reason.  Then-Professor Oaks explained that deterrence is implausible where there are 
“competing norms of police behavior.”  Oaks, supra , 37 U. CHI. L. REV. at 727.  Oaks cited 
several studies that reported police officers often felt justified in violating search and seizure 
principles.  Such competing police norms seem particularly likely to develop where the 
United States Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the officer's behavior.   
 A final reason for the lack of deterrent effect to independent state rules is the 
possibility of avoiding the state rules by “going federal.”  It appears to be a generally 
                                              
13.  For example, the Larocco plurality criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).  Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469.  Yet whatever its 
faults, Carney generated discussion in at least 75 places in published opinions in just its first 
three years, including references in 10 federal circuits and 17 states (Utah among them).  See 
12 SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS (Supp. 1986-88) (cases citing Carney). 
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accepted principle of the deterrence literature that certainty of punishment is an important 
factor in establishing a sanction's deterrent effect.  Yet state law enforcement officers who 
obtain evidence in violation of an independent state constitutional rule remain free to use that 
same evidence in a federal prosecution.  See, e.g., United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489 
(10th Cir. 1992).  Many serious crimes violate both federal and state criminal laws.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Bryan David Mitchell and Wanda Eileen Barzee, No. 2:08-CR-125 (D. Utah 
2008) (federal indictment charging federal kidnapping charges in Elizabeth Smart case, 
paralleling state charges).  It seems likely that this possibility of state officers serving 
illegally seized evidence to federal authorities on a “silver platter”14 undercuts the deterrent 
effect of any independent state exclusionary rule. 
C. A State Exclusionary Rule is Likely to Operate in Situations Where it is 
Disproportionate to the Constitutional Violation 
 The federal exclusionary rule has been criticized because of the disparity between the 
“offense” of an insubstantial constitutional violation and the “penalty” of releasing a guilty 
criminal.  The classic statement of the critique comes from Chief Justice Burger's dissent in 
Bivens, where he argued that although “[f]reeing either a tiger or a mouse in a schoolroom is 
an illegal act, . . . no rational person would suggest that these two acts should be punished in 
the same way.”  Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
                                              
14.  Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (repudiating then-existing "silver 
platter" doctrine which allowed evidence illegally seized by state officials in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to be used in federal courts). 
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 He concluded that “society has [a] right to expect rationally graded responses from 
judges in place of the universal ‘capital punishment’ we inflict on all evidence when police 
error is shown in its acquisition.” Id. at 419. This Court, too, has also recognized that 
exclusion of evidence can be a disproportionate sanction in some instances. See, e.g., State v. 
Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah 1987) (“suppression of evidence obtained as a result of 
Guinn's illegal investigation would be a remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained to 
the end of obtaining justice while preserving individual liberties unimpaired”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 This criticism has lead to several proposals for reforming the exclusionary rule.  For 
example, the American Law Institute (ALI) has suggested limiting the rule to situations 
involving a “substantial” violation of a constitutional right.  See MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Proposed Official Draft 1975) § SS 290.2.  In contrast, the 
great irony about Utah’s exclusionary rule is that it will operate only in those situations 
where the suppression of evidence is likely to be a disproportionate response to the 
constitutional violation.  Utah’s independent state exclusionary rule functions exclusively in 
areas where the United States Supreme Court has approved the law enforcement conduct in 
question.  In other words, it takes effect only in circumstances where reasonable minds can 
differ ‑‑ specifically, where at least five justices of the United States Supreme Court have 
found the search or seizure to be “reasonable” and thus constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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 On the other hand, the “cost” of applying the exclusionary rule in these situations is 
the suppression of reliable evidence with the possible, if not probable, consequence of the 
release of a guilty criminal – something of special concern to amicus Utah Council on 
Victims of Crime.  Thus, in Larocco, the state was unable to retry Larocco, and a car thief 
escaped justice; and in Thompson, the state could not retry the two defendants, who had been 
convicted of five counts of bribery, one count of antitrust violation, and one count of 
racketeering, and they went free as well.  See Cassell, supra, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 849. 
 In short, Utah’s exclusionary rule will generally produce unjust results.  It will come 
into play only when the police conduct has been approved by the United States Supreme 
Court; and yet the sanction will be the “single, monolithic, and drastic judicial response” 
Bivens v. Six Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), of 
suppression of reliable evidence – leaving the general public and crime victims to bear the 
costs.   
CONCLUSION 
 This Court should abolish the independent state exclusionary rule.  Doing so would 
greatly reduce the litigation involving article I, section 14, as criminal defendants would no 
longer have standing to raise state constitutional claims in criminal cases – including 
defendants like appellees Rowan and George.  Abolishing the exclusionary remedy, 
however, would in no way eliminate this Court’s ability to independently interpret article I, 
section 14.  All that would change is the remedy for enforcing the right.  Instead of 
suppressing reliable evidence of the guilt of criminals, the state constitutional right could be 
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enforced in traditional ways – such as civil and administrative remedies.  See generally 
Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 849-58 (discussing alternatives to the suppression of 
evidence for enforcing the state search and seizure provision); Jeremy M. Christiansen, State 
Search and Seizure: The Original Meaning, 38 HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (surveying 
all fifty states and finding that state constitutional search seizure provisions where 
historically understood as being enforced in ways that protected the rights of all citizens, not 
just those who had committed crimes) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2525954).  These are the same remedies 
that courts use to enforce other parts of the Utah Constitution, such as article I, § 15’s 
protection of freedom of speech and of the press and article I, § 4’s protection of religious 
liberty.  If traditional remedies work to secure these precious constitutional liberties, they 
should likewise secure the rights found in article I, section 14.   
 Indeed, if anything, reliance on the exclusionary rule has led to underprotection of 
state constitutional rights.  This Court has focused exclusively on exclusionary remedies to 
enforce article I, section 14.  Cf. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 273 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) 
(“This Court has never considered the appropriateness of possible exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule or the availability of alternative or supplemental remedies . . . .”).  By 
definition, the exclusionary rule can provide redress only to guilty criminals who seek to 
exclude evidence of their guilt in criminal trials; the rule does nothing for innocent persons 
whose rights have been violated.  Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994) (Under the federal exclusionary rule, “criminals go free, 
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while honest citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little or no real remedy.”).    
Indeed, the sad fact is that the state exclusionary rule has effectively transformed article I, 
section 14, from a right of all the people of the state into a right that exclusively protects 
those involved in crimes.  This is not a result envisioned by either the drafters of Utah’s 
Constitution or the state’s contemporary elected representatives. 
 For the foregoing reasons, amicus Utah Council on Victims of Crime respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the trial court on the grounds that article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not permit the exclusion of reliable evidence. 
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